The paper presents a previously unpublished index of the total British output of munitions, 1942-5. The index was produced in the Ministry of Production's Programmes Division 
Introduction
No officinal index of the total volume of munitions produced by the UK economy in World War II has ever been published. This is remarkable in itself, and places economic historians of the British war effort in a position inferior to those involved in study of the war production of other major powers. These three indicators were weighted by employment shares, setting 1942 (lst quarter) a 100.
The index clearly covered the great bulk of Britain's contribution to the total munitions output of the Allies.
There were a few omissions, some of them deliberate. For The weekly and monthly series do not run continuously throughout the war, and they reveal some discrepancies.
There was an unexplained break in the monthly series from A feature of the Robinson index which deserves comment is its variability. The weekly index was said to be vulnerable to two factors. One was the tendency of output to be concentrated in the last few days of the month in order to achieve monthly programmes. There were quarterly and annual programmes, too, but their influence on the bunching of production operations was of less concern. Another source of variation was the effect of Bank and annual holidays. stage was created by manpower policy. In war time manpower budgets were drawn up every six months or so.1s At this time the expected change in the nation's available labour resources had to be balanced with the change in forecast demand. On the demand side, a key element was the plans of the munitions producing ministries for increased output, with which would be associated increased labour requirements. These had to be summed and set against expected or necessary changes in civilian requirements. When draft munitions programmes were scaled down (as they invariably had to be), the associated (scaled down) manpower intake had to be feasible. The Robinson index helped to check the expected demands of munitions production against resources available and to balance the economy." 
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The Robinson index -its uses today
Decomposing the Robinson index
In order to improve upon the Robinson index, we must first take it apart and establish how it works. This is done below in Table 1 . The first two columns of the Table show quarterly averages of the index (Series A and H) as reported in the monthly Surveys. The third column shows my best attempt to simulate it. The simulated index shown in Table 1 This revision is shown to have almost no effect.
Second to be considered is replacement of the total structure weight of completed aircraft by structure weight adjusted for man-hours. This was only one and a half months before the midpoint of Robinson's base period, three months short of the four and a half month lag specified by Robinson for use of employment as a proxy for warship completion. A weekly series of employment in war production, broken down between the three supply departments, first appeared in the NPR only in May 1943, and ran only until March of the following year.
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Figures based on quarterly censuses of employment went back to December 1941, and from August 1942 attempts were made to estimate employment in the intervening months. These are available from the monthly Surveys. However, the monthly estimates frequently turned out to understate the apparently rapid underlying change in munitions employment when the results of quarterly censuses became available. This gives rise to another problem: there were no continuous series for the whole war ;period but rather several discontinuous, overlapping series reflecting succeeding revisions.
In fact, Robinson's staff had four distinct and overlapping primary series to draw on in order to derive a continuous series for wartime employment in the munitions industries. In Table D Third, Series C-1 must now be reconciled with Series D. I assume Series D to have been a firm estimate. However, I do not consider it safe to assume that Series C-1 should be chained on in the conventional way, which would mean a small deflation of every entry for the preceding two years. Instead, I graft it onto Series D in the same way that Series B-1 was grafted onto Series C. I continue to assume that the existing figure for 30 June 1942 (Series C) is firm, and I adjust intervening entries up to the and of 1943 by a similar adjustment factor.
The outcome is the series called 'adjusted' in the table. Let me repeat that 'adjusted' does not mean 'correct'. The 'adjusted' series may, however, reasonably have been regarded as correct at the time, in light of the information then available.
The last point to be explained is that, in order to find out how the original Robinson index worked, we need a figure for employment on Admiralty orders as of 30 September 1941 before the initiation of Series A. This is in order to apply the necessary lag to employment as an indicator of output: Here there is no alternative to backward linear extrapolation. I take the change in employment on Admiralty orders during 1941 (4th quarter) to be an average of the change in the following four quarters, and establish a September 1941 figure on this basis. (Washington, D.C., 1959) Statistical Digest of the War (1951) 
